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Introduction 
 
 
No Rivals to the King 
The Limits to Political Reform in Morocco’s “Enlightened Authoritarianism” 
Isabelle Werenfels and Ilyas Saliba 
In Morocco it is still the king who defines the boundaries of political discourse and 
action. The palace is increasingly placing obstacles in the path of its strongest adver-
sary, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD). This was seen most 
recently in the difficult and protracted coalition negotiations following the October 
2016 parliamentary elections. At the same time, pressure on civil society critics is 
steadily intensifying. The inherent promise of political reform in Morocco’s compara-
tively inclusive model is increasingly eroding and gradually substituted with the promise 
of economic modernisation, potentially undermining the very bases of the kingdoms 
domestic stability. It is thus also in Europe’s interests for Morocco to uphold the pro-
gress it has achieved through the political reforms of recent decades. 
 
On March 15th 2017, King Mohammed VI 
of Morocco withdrew Abdelilah Benkirane’s 
mandate to form a new government. In the 
five months since October 2016 the popular 
serving prime minister and PJD leader had 
failed to establish a viable coalition. Due to 
the election results he would have needed 
support from parties close to the palace. Yet 
the king’s chosen replacement, PJD stalwart 
and former foreign minister Saadeddine El 
Othmani, succeeded in breaking the dead-
lock within just a few days. This suggests 
that the “palace” – the king and his patron-
age network of advisors, business elites, 
bureaucrats and “royalist parties” – had 
been working to rid itself of it’s increasing-
ly troublesome adversary. 
The PJD increased its parliamentary rep-
resentation under Benkirane, remaining 
ahead of the royalist Authenticity and 
Modernity Party (PAM). The PJD also did 
well in the 2015 local and regional elec-
tions. As prime minister, Benkirane pulled 
off the delicate balancing act of cutting 
subsidies without it leading to major pro-
tests, but he occasionally deviated from the 
king’s line by criticising Russia’s role in 
Syria and condemning the king’s entourage 
for clinging on to their privileges and pre-
serving their hegemonic role in politics and 
the economy. Benkirane’s rise and prelimi-
nary fall demonstrate that the Moroccan 
system, where the constitution makes the 
king both “Commander of the Faithful” 
and head of state, has no room for a second 
charismatic leader. 
However, under the 2011 constitutional 
reform, the king must choose a representa-
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tive of the strongest party to form a govern-
ment. Hence, the palace had little choice 
but to integrate the PJD. As an experienced 
diplomat and intellectual, the new prime 
minister Saadeddine El Othmani is the 
antithesis of Benkirane, whose popularity 
is rooted in his ability to communicate with 
the “ordinary people”. Othmani, regarded 
as reserved and consensus-seeking, made 
major concessions to the palace to establish 
his coalition. 
Tight Constraints on Competition 
The PJD holds none of the key ministries 
in its new government, which is a coalition 
including several pro-palace technocratic 
ministers in addition to three conservative 
royalist parties – the National Rally of In-
dependents (RNI), the Popular Movement 
(MP) and the Constitutional Union (UC) – 
and two left-wing parties loyal to the palace: 
the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) 
and the Party of Progress and Socialism 
(PPS). The recently founded royalist PAM, 
which came second in the parliamentary 
elections, and the liberal nationalist Istiqlal 
together form the opposition. In this con-
stellation, the PJD is now even more strongly 
fenced in by pro-palace forces in the formal 
political institutions. Moreover, with the 
socialist-secular USFP a traditionally anti-
Islamist party is part of the new PJD-led 
government. The king’s intervention and 
the inclusion of anti-islamist heavyweights 
in the government coalition is causing 
substantial friction within the PJD, and is 
undermining Othmani’s internal support. 
So why is the PJD still playing along, 
given that the palace has worked persis-
tently since 2012 to weaken it? The regional 
political climate in the Middle East and 
North Africa certainly plays an important 
role. The military coup against Egyptian 
President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 
set off a witch-hunt against the Muslim 
Brotherhood and those perceived closed to 
it. The PJD, though not targeted directly, 
has responded by working even harder to 
normalize its relations with palace and the 
established political actors. The PJD is well 
aware that it would be able to achieve little 
for its supporters in opposition, and thus 
credible opposition would be politically 
costly. Any fundamental criticism of the 
king’s dominant role in the state and the 
economy prompts state harassment and 
repression. This is evident, for example, in 
the discriminatory treatment of members 
of the – officially unrecognised – Islamist 
movement Al Adl Wal Ihsane. 
But the palace also has an interest in 
keeping the PJD on board, as the moderate 
Islamist party plays a crucial role in stabi-
lising the political system by including the 
religiously conservative echelons of society 
within the existing institutions. This likely 
prevents individual radicalisation due to 
the party’s reach and strong organisational 
cohesion. The PJD’s effective mobilisation 
of its supporters also ensures electoral turn-
out levels that are at least halfway accept-
able; this is important to maintain a 
democratic appearance. As such, the PJD 
boosts the national and international 
legitimacy of Moroccan institutions. 
Moreover, the party’s liberal economic 
policies satisfy the needs of the palace, 
which is the country’s central economic 
actor. The reductions in fuel and gas sub-
sidies implemented by the PJD during the 
last parliament are part of a palace strategy 
of budget consolidation and concessions in 
the face of long-standing demands by inter-
national donors. In other words, here the 
PJD helped the palace to implement an 
unpopular project. This is symptomatic of 
the “division of labour” established by the 
palace in the Moroccan system. 
The Moroccan Model 
While the elected government is respon-
sible for the daily business of government, 
the palace controls all matters of strategic 
importance: religion, foreign policy, and 
defence and security, as well as migration 
policy and energy and infrastructure. The 
palace maintains absolute authority over 
all aspects relating to the Western Sahara 
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conflict, which continues to determine 
the king’s domestic and foreign policy 
priorities. 
In recent years, the palace has been able 
to achieve visible progress in almost all the 
aforementioned strategic areas. Morocco 
obtained membership of the African Union 
in January 2017 despite Algerian and South 
African objections, and it is garnering grow-
ing African support for its annexation of 
Western Sahara. The palace has also scored 
recent successes with its renewable energy 
expansion, cooptation of leading Salafists 
into the political system, and a migration 
policy, which is creating laws and struc-
tures for immigration from Sub-Saharan 
Africa to Morocco. 
Compared with other states in the Middle 
East and North Africa, Morocco enjoys a high 
degree of political inclusion and stability. 
In conjunction with the domestic and for-
eign policy successes mentioned above, it is 
no surprise that Europe regards Morocco’s 
“enlightened authoritarianism” as a broad 
success and a captivating alternative to 
the Tunisian democratisation model. Most 
importantly it appears to guarantee sta-
bility, contrasting sharply with Libya’s 
descent into civil war, Egypt’s repressive 
military regime and Algeria’s unpredictable 
authoritarianism. What is often overlooked 
is that the Moroccan model is encountering 
growing pressures, due to demographic and 
socio-economic developments – and in 
response is becoming increasingly less 
inclusive. 
The Limits of Inclusion 
It is unclear to what extent this model of 
governance will prove workable in the fore-
seeable future. A series of protests shook 
Morocco in 2016: against education reforms, 
for better public services, and in October 
2016 after police involvement in the grue-
some death of a fishmonger in Al Hoceïma, 
a town in Morocco’s neglected Rif region. 
Anger over the latter incident spread across 
the whole country and forced the king to 
order an inquiry. Nevertheless, protests in 
the Rif continued throughout the spring 
of 2017. As disparate and singular as these 
protests appear, their structural causes 
are similar: lack of reforms, rampant cor-
ruption, and socio-economic grievances, 
especially very high youth unemployment 
levels. 
Even if the growing protests are not 
going to topple the monarchy, they point 
to grievances undermining what has to date 
been an adaptable and functioning system. 
Increasing repression and simultaneous 
marginalisation in institutional processes 
are creating growing incentives for reform-
minded forces and civil society activists to 
bring their supporters onto the streets. 
Popular confidence in the elected institu-
tions is evaporating in the face of repeated 
palace interventions, as exemplified by the 
choice of prime minister. 
By ostentatiously displaying its power 
over the PJD, the palace is walking a fine 
line: what is intended as controlled 
weakening of the party may result in com-
pletely discrediting it vis-à-vis its constitu-
ency. In doing so, the palace undermines 
the system’s inclusiveness and may push 
disgruntled PJD-followers toward groups 
outside the formal political system. 
In 2011, as Arab dictators fell and Moroc-
cans also took to the streets to voice their 
grievances, King Mohammed initiated polit-
ical reforms to give people an outlet for 
their anger. But since 2012 the palace has 
increasingly met protests with repression. 
Regime-critical civil society actors, such as 
independent human rights groups, find 
themselves on a tighter leash, with counter-
terrorism frequently serving as an excuse 
to curtail liberties. Academics, journalists 
and activists experience intimidation, while 
expulsions of foreign journalists, activists 
and organisations are on the rise. For some 
years, local and international observers 
have been reporting growing infringements 
of political and civil liberties in Morocco. 
With the new constitution of 2011, the 
king made a political promise of reforms that 
has only partially been fulfilled. Although 
progress has been made on decentralisa-
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tion, elected institutions and the courts 
have gained little additional authority and 
autonomy. In fact, signs from the palace 
suggest a retrenchment of the political 
reform process. Hardliners apparently re-
gret the constitutional concessions, such 
as decentralisation, judicial independence, 
the strengthening of parliament and the 
appointment of the prime minister from 
the ranks of the strongest party. 
There are indications that the palace is 
increasingly moving away from the Moroc-
can model of enlightened authoritarianism. 
Under this model the monarchy has opted 
for inclusion and cooptation of a steadily 
growing spectrum of actors into the formal 
political process since the late 1990s, while 
in parallel gradually reducing repression. 
In doing so, it managed to successfully safe-
guard the stability of both state and regime. 
The palace’s more recent initiatives are 
concerned less with promises of political 
reform; instead they prioritise modernisa-
tion with headline-grabbing infrastructure 
projects such as high-speed rail and gigan-
tic solar power plants. 
All this poses the question whether the 
palace may be moving towards a less inclu-
sive “developmental dictatorship” model 
that justifies a lack of political and civil 
rights as the price for progress in moderni-
sation and the prospect of a rising standard 
of living. This would fit not only with the 
nature of the palace’s domestic political 
interventionism, but also with the coun-
try’s investment partnership with China 
and its growth-led turn to the African 
continent. 
Options for Europe 
Internal developments in Morocco are highly 
relevant to Europe for obvious reasons, as 
they are related to European key concerns, 
namely counter-terrorism and migration. 
The preservation of the inclusive and stabi-
lising Moroccan model is consequently in 
Europe’s interest. Brussels’ diplomatic rela-
tions with Rabat, however, have been at a 
nadir since 2015, when a European Court 
ruled that the agreement on trade in agri-
cultural and fishery products between the 
EU and Morocco cannot apply to Western 
Sahara (a position confirmed by a Euro-
pean Court of Justice ruling in late 2016). 
Rabat’s outrage over the ruling further 
narrowed the EU’s already modest options 
for influencing developments within 
Morocco. 
Nonetheless, foreign policy actors in 
the EU and its member states must not close 
their eyes to developments in Morocco. 
A modernisation project that comes with 
shrinking political spaces is unlikely to pre-
serve domestic stability in the long term. 
Hence, it makes little sense to measure 
Morocco’s reform process and stability 
against prevailing regional conditions and 
to praise it as a shining example of democ-
racy and human rights. Instead problematic 
developments, such as reprisals against 
regime critics, must be pointed out. 
Given the EU Commission’s 160 million 
euros in budget aid in 2016 and running 
development projects with a volume of over 
a billion euros, Europe is not an irrelevant 
player in Morocco. Still, it is questionable 
whether strengthening political condition-
ality in the current situation would have 
positive effects on the transformation pro-
cess or the human rights situation. How-
ever, making (pre-emptory) concessions, 
such as ending cooperation with critics of 
the palace, would send the wrong message 
as well. 
Instead European support for civil 
society actors, elected bodies and executive 
institutions not directly controlled by the 
palace needs to be stepped up, in order to 
strengthen the independence and credibil-
ity of democratically elected institutions. 
In the longer term, such support could have 
a positive influence on the stalled political 
reform process and contribute to ongoing 
stability. The existence of a political coun-
terweight to the palace is the best guaran-
tee that Morocco will find its way back onto 
the road to political reform and expand 
inclusion once again. 
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